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General
Awareness Updates – December 2009 Miscellaneous-2
There’s none so blind as they that won’t see.*
Today, security experts describe
the threat from Naxal groups as a direct challenge to the might of the
Who are Naxals? What is their
ideology? An appreciation of these twin interlinked questions would help us
understand the violent nature of the Naxal movement.
A peasant uprising & the birth of
Naxalism
The word ‘Naxalism’ comes
from the name of a
The movement assumed larger
dimensions when the state units of CPI (M) in Uttar Pradesh, Jammu &
Kashmir, and some sections of the state units in
Ideology: Power through the barrel of a
gun
Naxalism, given its violent nature
and stated aims, is a ‘political ideology’, and ‘not a socio-economic
movement dedicated to the uplift of the poor.’ Naxals believe in
Marxist-Leninist as well as Maoist ideologies. These twin ideologies extol
violence as a means to “seize political power”.
Naxalism has always debunked
democracy and its institutions. The bullet, and not the ballot, the Naxals
believe, is the means to seizure of State power. As Charu Mazumdar, considered
the father of the Naxal movement, once observed, “Militant struggles must be
carried on not for land, crops, etc., but for the seizure of State power”.
The abject failure of successive
governments to address the deplorable socio-economic conditions in backward
rural areas, especially where the Naxals hold considerable sway, have only made
it easy for the Naxals to exploit the discontentment among the poor and
illiterate people to further their own cause.
Naxals operate in dense forests,
which are ideally suited to carry out guerrilla warfare. The ideal conditions
include a local population alienated due to their exploitation by vested
interests like landlords, moneylenders, contractors, and lower-end bureaucracy,
difficult terrain facilitating ‘hit and run’ operations and, above all, the
lack of effective grassroots administration.
No one can deny the fact that the
socio-economic conditions in these areas are very bad. Though there are many
well-intentioned government schemes for the development of these areas, these
have unfortunately remained only on paper.
Territorial hotbeds
While the Naxal movement and
consequent insurgency is over four decades old, it is only now that it is
finally beginning to register on the national consciousness as a significant
threat to
The Naxalbari movement spread from
Andhra Pradesh. Naxalism has
found many takers in north (Telangana) and north coastal regions of Andhra
Pradesh. These regions are populated by impoverished and illiterate tribals and
non-tribals.
Naxalism has had a more persistent
and sound base in Andhra Pradesh, particularly in Telangana, than any other
part of
The Naxals are armed with
sophisticated weapons and ammunition. According to AP Police records, the
Naxals here include over 1,300 full-time ‘underground cadre’ besides
over 9,000 overground extremists in the state. Intelligence agencies admit that
the Naxal writ runs unchallenged in the so-called ‘Naxal heartland’ (also known
as Command Zone), which extends into Chhattisgarh and the Dandakaranya forest
region of Orissa. However, the merger of the PWG with the CPI (ML)-Party Unity
Group has extended this Command Zone into the violent badlands of Jharkhand and
Naxal strategy and external links
Law enforcement agencies believe
that the Naxal strategy is to first create “guerrilla zones” in the
forest and tribal areas which would ultimately be extended to surround and
encircle urban centres of power.
While this may, today, seem a
chimera, mark the words of the hardcore Leftist ideologue Vara Vara Rao, who
more than a decade back, said: “Compared to the early 1990s, today’s
position is very strong. In fact, in north Telangana and Dandakaranya, [the
Naxals] have reached an advanced stage of forming guerilla zones. We visualise
Dandakaranya as a base area for forming a people’s army with platoons of 200
red guards each.”
Between then and now, the Naxals
have only strengthened their position. What has disturbed the intelligence
agencies deeply is the fact that these Naxal organisations have established
strong network linkage with the Maoists in Nepal, the LTTE in Sri Lanka (the
secessionist outfit is more or less defunct now), and Left Wing extremist
groups in the Philippines.
How deep and extensive their
relationship is, can be gauged from one startling and revealing fact: the
Maoists have built a ‘revolutionary corridor’ starting from Andhra Pradesh,
passing through Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Bihar, and ending
in Nepal. The Maoists call this corridor the Compact Revolutionary Zone
(CRZ). The free and illegal movement of the Maoists between the two countries
is facilitated by the porous border between Nepal and India, poor law and order
machinery (especially in Bihar, which shares the international border with Nepal),
and lack of political will to tackle the growing menace.
Today, there are an estimated
55,000 Naxals armed with sophisticated weapons and trained in guerrilla
warfare. Why is this phenomenal growth happening? Says Ajay Mehra of the Centre
for Policy Research: “The virtual disappearance of land reforms from the
policy firmament with economic liberalisation and the consequent focus on rural
development programmes which integrate the rural economy with the global
market, have kept the Naxal agenda relevant for the rural poor. The
Food-for-Work programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and
other such anti-poverty programmes have never addressed the question of land
rights in rural
“Paradoxically, despite the
democratisation of the social power structure, the distributive aspects of land
have remained complicated, with the continued marginalisation of Dalits and
Adivasis / Girijans... [Indeed] such situations across states have provided
Naxals with a fertile recruitment ground.
“While the introduction of
Panchayati Raj will be helpful to an extent, only structural measures
undertaken to restore tribal rights over land can prevent their manipulation by
local elites.
“The Centre and affected states
have committed about Rs.2,000 crore to equip the security forces for anti-Naxal
operations, while the Central allocation for development activities is a meagre
Rs.2 crore per annum per district.”
Meeting the Challenge
Salva Judum in
Chhattisgarh: Eye for an eye. In the recent past, Chhattisgarh has seen
higher levels of violence and casualties. The stepped up violence in
Chhattisgarh is attributed mainly to a strong offensive by the Naxals to derail
Salva Judum.
In Chhattisgarh, the Salva Judum, a
strong grassroots movement is heralding a slow but sure change in people’s
response to the Naxal menace. The Salva Judum is indirectly funded, but
directly supported, by the government. The movement started in 2004 in
Dantewada district; the local tribal population organised themselves by
guarding important places and roads, which are prone to Naxal attacks. The
political parties, including the BJP and the Congress, backed this movement.
What is the rationale behind the
State supporting this kind of a movement? The Salva Judum is organised in
remote tribal areas of Chhattisgarh. When violence erupts in these regions, the
establishment finds it difficult to reach the spot in an emergency. Given the
inability of the State to protect them, the people live in a state of constant
fear. While they may not join a Naxal group, they are often forced to support
these non-State actors, as the State, for all practical purposes, does not
exist in these areas.
Carrot & stick
At a meeting of Chief Ministers on
Internal Security held in December 2007, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
said: “It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of Naxalism
is the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.
There seems to be unanimity on the fact that we need to give the problem a very
high priority”. He urged the various state governments to send a strong
message that the “political leadership of the country can rise above
political and party affiliations when it comes to facing national challenges,
particularly those concerning internal security.”
He said that the states affected by
Naxal violence needed to do a better job of gathering intelligence and
coordinating security operations, as well as beefing up and modernising their police
forces. At the same time, the Prime Minister lamented the country’s failure to
deliver social justice and development to its poorest regions, a neglect which
had alienated people and helped feed the insurgency.
The Prime Minister said that the
state governments had to focus on “good governance” and eliminate “leak”
of development funds — in other words, stop stealing the money meant for the
poor. “Our strategy, therefore, has to be to walk on two legs — to have an
effective police response while at the same time focusing on reducing the sense
of deprivation and alienation.”
The Central Government has said
that it would adopt tough measures to combat the Naxal menace through a
“concrete and stern” action plan that envisages modernisation of security
forces to tackle what they describe is a “key internal security concern”. The
Central Government has prepared an action-plan which is a consolidation of
various measures including fortifying the states against the Naxals by
providing the forces with modern weaponry, dedicated intelligence network and
special training in anti-Naxal operations.
Political analysts suggest a
multi-pronged approach to bring peace to the affected areas. Two of the most
important suggestions are: first, the administration should take steps to
bridge the gaps responsible for the basic socio-economic causes for rural
discontentment viz., land disputes, widespread poverty, unemployment; second, a
proper well-prepared detailed plan should be conceived to deal with the
violence unleashed by the Naxals.
The Central Government perceives
the socio-economic, political, and regional inequalities widely prevalent in
the country, as the major reasons for the continuation and expansion of
Naxalism. To arrest this expansion of Left Wing extremism, the Centre has asked
the states to accord high priority to the development of the affected areas.
All states governments agree that
development of backward areas is indeed the long-term solution to tackle
Naxalism. Also, a major measure required is a massive expansion in the police
presence, with properly manned and equipped police stations rolled out in
Naxal-dominated areas.
Causal approach to justify violence?
Revolutionary
violence including Left extremism must be evaluated by criteria other than the
general ‘causal’ approach that seeks to justify it in terms of historical
wrongs and contemporary inequalities. Said a political analyst: “Since this
movement has had a controversial and turbulent existence on
Explicit in the argument is the
ever-widening gap between the proclaimed intention and the actuality. All kinds
of revolutionaries (the Naxals are no exception) believe that they can, at one
stroke, dismantle democracy and consequently, its institutions. They believe
that this action alone is the adequate corrective. The fact is that democracy
does offer institutions and instruments of social change and transformation,
and however inefficient they may be in a particular situation, they are
ordinarily more effective than the option of directionless and largely
randomised violence that the Naxals seems to perpetuate.
Naxal violence is “misdirected
and politically counterproductive because the Naxal groups in
The Central and state governments
should ensure that the fruits of development reach even those inhabiting the
most backward areas. Only then can we lay a strong foundation for an equitable,
stable, and peaceful society. This can happen only when the Central Government
stops dithering over the approach to tackle the Naxal menace and comes down
with an iron hand on those who disrupt the development of a more equitable and
prosperous society.
In short, our lack of a strong
response to the enormous danger that the Naxals pose to the internal security
of
* Jonathan Swift
(1667-1745), Irish satirist, in Polite Conversation (dialogue III)  |
