General Awareness Updates – January 2010

Miscellaneous:1

Apocalypse Now?

... a war of necessity.

On December 1, after weeks of procastinating, the U.S. President Barack Obama announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be deployed to Afghanistan. These troops will be deployed on an accelerated timeline to reinforce the 68,000 U.S. troops and 39,000 (non-U.S.) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of the NATO already present in Afghanistan.

Also, for the first time ever, the U.S. announced a deadline for troop withdrawal: July 2011, subject to conditions. Said Mr. Obama: “Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There’s no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan — General McChrystal — has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable.

“These forces will increase our capacity to train effective Afghan Security Forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans get into the fight. And by pursuing these partnerships, we can transition to Afghan responsibility, and begin to reduce our combat troops in the summer of 2011. In short, these resources will allow us to make the final push that is necessary to train Afghans so that we can transfer responsibility.

Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

The troop increase had been necessitated by the spectre of rising violence against the foreign forces and the Hamid Karzai Administration by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Over the last few months the resurgent Taliban have hit back at the foreign forces, killing scores of them.

It’s just not the American and ISAF troops alone who are vulnerable; the anarchic security situation in Afghanistan has turned all foreigners (and locals, as well) into soft targets for the Taliban. To understand why the situation has come to such a pass, we need to go back in time into Afghanistan’s recent past. This article will focus on the emergence of the Mujahidden during the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Red Army, move on to trace the rise of the Taliban, and analyse the factors that have led to the current anarchy.

Tribalism & unforgiving landscapes

Two things characterise Afghanistan: tribalism and unforgiving landscapes. Rivalry for power is often the hallmark of a tribal society. The struggle for territorial hegemony is inbred in tribes (and often in nations as well). For centuries, Afghanistan has been home to such battles, sometimes between tribes, sometimes between nations.

Afghanistan is a land of unforgiving landscapes. Barren lands and undulating mountains crisscross the country. The treacherous rocky terrain has spawned a legend: Afghans say that God had a pile of rocks left over after creation, and so he made Afghanistan.

A gate and a wedge

Because of its strategic location, Afghanistan has, over the decades, become both a wedge and a gate in the “Great Game”. Afghanistan is seen as a springboard to the huge resources of oil and gas in the Central Asian nations. It would be too simplistic to separate any strategic move in Afghanistan by global powers (like the USSR and the U.S.) and regional powers (like India and Pakistan) from the moves to secure the much-coveted energy reserves.

The Red Army in Afghanistan

A 1973 military coup led by Soviet-backed Communists in the Afghan army ousted the last scion of the Durrani dynasty, in 1933. The Soviet Red Army marched into Kabul in December 1978.

Soon after the invasion, the U.S., wary of Soviet expansionist designs, sold the ‘Islam is in danger’ story to the Islamic World, especially Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. To further its goal of ousting the Communists from Afghanistan, the U.S. engaged the Saudi royal house and the Pakistani political and military establishment to wage a proxy war against the Red Army.

Pakistan ensured that America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) channeled all weapons, purchased with Saudi money, through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which trained the Mujahidden from various countries. The ISI, which decided ‘who’ would get ‘what’, had the final say in matters related to operational issues.

It was thus that during the Cold War, Afghanistan became a battle-ground for a ‘hot war’ between the world’s two superpowers, though the U.S. sought to fight its war making the Islamic Mujahidden its proxy.

Stirred, shaken, and finally, sapped by the zeal of the Mujahidden, the Soviet Red Army retreated from Afghanistan in 1989. The defeat of a superpower emboldened the Islamists to think in an entirely new way: with limited numbers and limited resources, a holy war could defeat the other superpower also.

As the war ended, the CIA abandoned Pakistan and Afghanistan without taking back the thousands of weapons in the hands of the Mujahidden. Having achieved victory, these Mujahidden fanned out to different parts of the world and set up local militant groups in The Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Indonesia (Jemmah Islamiya), Egypt (Islamic Brotherhood), Kashmir (Hizbul Mujahidden, Lashkar-e-Taiba), China (East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang province), and in almost all Central Asian Islamic republics.

The Birth of the Taliban

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89), the civil war between the Red Army and the Islamists saw a constant tussle for control of Kabul. While powerful warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burnahuddin Rabbani fought for control of the capital, the countryside was mostly controlled by hundreds of petty and corrupt warlords, who imposed repressive measures on the hapless Afghans.

The warlords levied and collected taxes from road users passing through their “area”. The tax collection abuse became a menace, which bred resentment in the population against these warlords.

In the summer of 1994, these road bandits stopped a convoy, just north of Kandahar. The convoy belonged to a wealthy and influential Pakistani who demanded that the Pakistani government intervene and secure the release of the captured convoy.

The Pakistani government, which did not want to intervene directly, instead directed the ISI to seek the help of the radical Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI). The JUI ran several madrassas (Islamic seminaries) where a large number of Afghan students (refugees who fled their homeland during the 1979-89 war) were enrolled. The JUI used these students to organise a local militia against the warlords, which had held the convoy to ransom.

About 2000 volunteers of the JUI, who called themselves ‘Taliban’, meaning ‘students’, freed the convoy after decimating the forces of the warlords. Flush with success, they successfully captured Kandahar. The Taliban were given a rousing reception by the locals, who hated the local warlord for the misery he had inflicted on them. The Taliban’s impeccable behaviour helped them gain a reputation for being honest and religious. At this time, the Taliban did not impose any of the harsh measures (like the imposition of a strict and ultra-orthodox Islamic code of conduct) for which it later gained international notoriety.

The Taliban in Kabul

By the end of 1996, the Taliban had captured nearly 90 per cent of the country’s territory including Kabul. From Kabul, the Taliban declared the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Only three countries—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—recognised the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan.

The ousted warlords, mostly non-Pashtuns (unlike the Pashtun Taliban), joined hands to take on the Taliban. However, they were left with control of only 10 per cent of the country’s territory. They set up base in the country’s north and hence the anti-Taliban grouping came to be called the Northern Alliance.

The Northern Alliance was lent support –military, diplomatic, and logistical – by Central Asian republics, which feared that the Taliban might sweep into their countries. India, mindful of an anti-India and pro-Pakistan government in Kabul, also provided the Northern Alliance with the required ‘assistance’.

Once firmly in the saddle, the Taliban began to impose restrictive measures against the cultivation of poppy (from which opium is produced), dubbing it anti-Islam. However, such measures were largely for public consumption because in reality, the Taliban’s biggest chunk of revenue came from sale of narcotics in the international market. The large revenue generated from sale of narcotics was used to further bolster its control over the country.

Pakistan and the Taliban

The Taliban is Pakistan’s baby. Pakistan nurtured the Taliban by arming and training them, by funding their operations, and by lending them significant moral and diplomatic support.

Pakistan nurtured the Taliban because the latter furthered its cause. A long-sought aim of Islamabad has been to end the ‘two-border squeeze’, from India (in the east) and Afghanistan (in the west).

With a friendly dispensation in Kabul, which would do anything at its bidding, Pakistan did not have to worry about its western frontier. The presence of the Taliban came in handy for Pakistan as now it could focus on exporting terrorism to India. Another advantage was that Pakistan could now bundle off all terrorists, accused of terror attacks against western nations, to Afghanistan where they would find a safe haven.

Of course, there is that eternal economic angle to the whole strategy: Pakistan has always sought access to the large oil and gas reserves in Central Asia.

The Taliban and Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is known to be the foremost Islamic terrorist group in the world. Al Qaeda (literally ‘The Base’ or ‘The Foundation’) was founded by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian-Jordanian ideologue, in 1987. Ever since its founding, Al Qaeda has carried out hundreds of terrorist attacks against the West, especially against the U.S., and governments of pro-West Muslim nations. Today, Osama bin Laden is the undisputed leader of this amorphous group.

After Sudan, under intense American pressure, asked him to leave the country in 1998, Osama bin Laden was welcomed by the Taliban. In a matter of few months, Al Qaeda became the virtual ruler of Afghanistan. It is said to be the first instance in world history where a country was being ruled by terrorist organisations.

9/11 changes Afghanistan’s destiny

After the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, the Taliban rebuffed the U.S. demand to hand over Osama bin Laden.

A month after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. launched the “War on Terror”, especially targeting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and vowed to nab Osama bin Laden. Within months, the Taliban was defeated and dethroned from power. However, the U.S. could not capture Osama. The top leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda found sanctuary in the tribal belt in north-west Pakistan, along the border with Afghanistan.

The Taliban enjoys considerable support in the frontier areas, especially in Waziristan. Many of the tribes in these areas share cultural, tribal, regional, and ideological affinity with the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The Taliban and Al Qaeda militants are also receiving support from another major source – the opium farmers in the south who fear the loss of their livelihood if the Afghanistan government extends its control over these areas. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have assured protection to the drug farmers and dealers. In fact, the revenue from the illicit drug trade is one of the biggest sources of funds for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The Taliban remain active in much of southern Afghanistan. Today they are using this area to launch hit and run attacks on the Americans, as well as NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and then retreat into the safe havens in the frontier region.

The resurgence of the Taliban in the south and the northeast border with Pakistan poses a very serious threat to Afghanistan’s internal security. Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of providing arms and ammunition and safe haven to the Taliban.

The foreign forces face considerable problems in countering the Taliban. The reasons are not far to see: the Taliban know the terrain like the back of the hand and also have the backing of the local population as well as the Pakistani military and political establishment.

Says Peter Tomsen, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan: “Pakistan has allowed the Taliban leadership to operate above ground for many years and operate training camps across the border. Pakistan’s military intelligence knows what’s going on in every square meter along the border.”